Charging more without losing the customers you have, and knowing within six months whether you did.
Most DTC brands are raising prices this year or thinking hard about it. Tariffs moved landed costs in 2025 and the rules moved again in 2026. The question isn’t whether price matters. It’s who pays for the change, and whether they stay.
The first number is why every pricing book opens with price: small changes in price move profit more than anything else a company controls. The second is the condition. The customers who punished the retailer in Anderson and Simester’s experiment were its best ones, who had bought most recently and paid the most.
So this guide shows the math that tells you how many customers a rise can afford to lose, then everything that decides whether you lose them: the reason, which prices move first, who hears first, what you do for subscribers and recent buyers, and where a stranger already gets a better deal than a loyal customer.
A price rise is a message to the customers who already trust you. Write it for them.
It builds on The Whole Machine for contribution margin and The Standing Order for subscription mechanics. First-order offers and discount habits belong to The First Offer.
Start with The Price Rise Audit, or with the one-page map below. Or follow a path:
Three tools and a scored audit run in the page. Nothing you type leaves your browser.
Examples that open with Say or Picture use made-up round numbers. Every source is listed in Appendix C. Where the law comes up, it’s an operator’s summary as of September 2026, not legal advice.
What this guide argues, and what would prove each claim wrong.
A position says what would prove it wrong. Test each on your own store.
Six decisions, in order. Each has one number that tells you whether you got it right, and one common way it goes wrong.
Most brands make one of these decisions, the new price, and let the other five happen by accident.
The whole book is above and always will be. These are the same chapters addressed individually, for linking to one idea rather than to ninety.
| Decision | The question | The number that tells you | Where it goes wrong |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. How much | How many buyers can this rise lose and still pay? | Break-even volume loss, per SKU | A rise sized to the cost, not to the margin |
| 2. Why | Will customers call the reason fair? | Complaints and cancel reasons that mention price | No reason, or a reason that sounds like opportunity |
| 3. What | Which prices move, and which stay? | Share of revenue from SKUs whose price customers know | Raising the hero first because it sells most |
| 4. Who first | Who hears before the site changes? | Share of subscribers and repeat buyers notified in time | Loyal customers learning the price from a charge |
| 5. What else | Where does a customer already pay more than a stranger? | Discount depth, new versus returning buyers | A new higher price next to a welcome offer existing customers can’t use |
| 6. Did it work | Did the customers who saw it stay? | 90- and 180-day repeat rate against a comparison group | Judging it on the next week’s conversion rate |
The decisions pull on each other. A bigger rise makes the reason matter more. Protecting subscribers costs money you count against the rise. A loyalty tax customers lived with at the old price becomes a reason to leave at the new one.
Twelve checks on whether you’re ready to raise prices, and whether your last rise cost you customers you didn’t count. About forty-five minutes with your margins, your offers and your customer data.
The audit isn’t about whether your prices are too low. It’s about whether you’d know what a rise did, and whether your store already makes loyal customers pay more than strangers.
Open your margins, live discount codes and automations, subscription settings and your last price change. Score each check 0 to 2: 0 if it failed or nobody can answer it, 1 if partly true, 2 if clean.
A price rise you can’t measure is a guess you’ll repeat.
Score as you go; your band appears when all twelve are in.
| Score | What it means | Read next |
|---|---|---|
| 20–24 | You’re ready. Raise with the break-even in hand, tell your customers first, and read the result at 90 and 180 days. | Saying It, then The Price Rise Scorecard |
| 14–19 | The math is mostly there; the protection for existing customers isn’t. Fix the zeros before the new prices go live. | The chapter linked from your lowest check, then Grandfathering and Notice |
| 8–13 | A rise now would be a guess about volume and a gamble with your best customers. Do the math and the loyalty tax audit first. | How Many Customers You Can Lose, then The Loyalty Tax Audit |
| 0–7 | Don’t raise prices this month. Build contribution per SKU and a way to measure retention, then come back. | The Biggest Lever, With a Condition, then The First Thirty Days |
If you’ve never changed a price, checks 7, 8 and 10 may not apply yet. Score them on the plan you’d follow. If you don’t sell subscriptions, score check 7 on repeat buyers alone.
The most quoted number in pricing is right. It also assumes the one thing a price rise puts at risk.
In 1992, Michael Marn and Robert Rosiello of McKinsey published an article in the Harvard Business Review that every pricing book since has quoted. They took the average economics of 2,463 companies in the Compustat database and asked what a 1% improvement in each part of the income statement would do to operating profit.
| A 1% improvement in | Raises operating profit by |
|---|---|
| Price | 11.1% |
| Variable cost | 7.8% |
| Volume | 3.3% |
| Fixed cost | 2.3% |
PublishedMarn and Rosiello, “Managing Price, Gaining Profit,” Harvard Business Review, September–October 1992, Exhibit 1.
Some summaries quote the price figure as 10.29%. The article says 11.1%, and I found no primary source for 10.29%. A 2003 McKinsey update by Marn, Eric Roegner and Craig Zawada, using the average S&P 1500 company, put it at about 8% Published.
The article’s sentence is precise: “a 1% improvement in price, assuming no loss of volume, increases operating profit by 11.1%” Published. Everything depends on that middle clause.
The article’s own numbers tell you how fragile that is. An 11.1% gain from 1% of revenue means operating profit was about 9% of sales. A 3.3% gain from 1% more volume means each sale contributed about 30% after variable costs. At that cost structure, a 1% price rise stops paying if it loses more than about 3.3% of volume Derived.
The 11.1% is what a price rise earns if nobody notices. Customers who’ve bought from you before always notice.
The best summary of how volume responds to price is a meta-analysis by Tammo Bijmolt, Harald van Heerde and Rik Pieters. They collected 1,851 price elasticities from 81 studies, and the average was −2.62: a 1% rise in price, on average, came with a 2.62% fall in sales Published.
Put that average into Marn and Rosiello’s company and the 11.1% becomes about 2% Derived. An average across many categories isn’t your number, and a brand with loyal buyers and a product nobody else makes may do better. But zero is not a reasonable guess for your volume loss.
One division tells you the volume a price rise can lose and still leave you where you started. Write it next to every increase before you decide.
You will lose some customers. The question is how many you can lose before the rise costs more than it earns. That number is easy to work out, and almost nobody writes it down.
rise ÷ (margin + rise)
Both in percent of today’s price. Margin is contribution margin: price minus every cost that comes with one more unit sold. A 10% rise on a 40% margin can lose 10 ÷ 50 = 20% of volume and still leave contribution where it was.
This is the standard break-even sales formula from Thomas Nagle and Georg Müller’s The Strategy and Tactics of Pricing Published. It works because a rise adds its whole amount to each unit’s contribution. At a 40% margin, a 10% rise takes contribution per unit from 40 cents on each old dollar of price to 50, so four units at the new price earn what five did at the old one.
Use contribution margin, not gross margin: take out landed product cost with duty, pick and pack, the shipping you pay, packaging, payment fees and the average discount the SKU actually sells at. The Whole Machine covers contribution per order.
DerivedRise ÷ (margin + rise), for the margins and rises shown.
Say a brand sells 10,000 units a month of its main product at $40. Product, freight, duty, pick and pack, shipping and fees come to $24 a unit, so contribution is $16, a 40% margin, and $160,000 a month. It raises the price 8%, to $43.20. Contribution per unit becomes $19.20. To earn $160,000 at $19.20 it needs 8,333 units. So it can lose 1,667 units a month, 16.7% of volume, before the rise costs money.
If it loses 5%, it sells 9,500 units and makes $182,400, up $22,400 a month. If it loses 20%, it makes $153,600, down $6,400. Same rise, a win or a quiet loss, depending on a number nobody knows yet. So write the break-even down first and measure against it after (chapter 14).
Write the break-even next to the rise. A 10% drop in orders is a win or a loss, and only that number says which.
With the defaults, the rise can lose 16.7% of volume, about 1,667 units a month, and at a 5% loss it adds $22,400 of contribution a month. The break-even elasticity is −2.08: if your buyers respond less strongly than that, the rise pays. Compare that with the −2.62 average from the last chapter and you can see why the margin matters. A brand at a 40% margin whose buyers responded like that average would have lost money on this rise.
When a tariff or supplier raises your cost, compare the rise with doing nothing at the new cost. Put today’s landed cost into the tool. Your margin is lower, so the same rise can afford to lose more buyers. A cost increase is the easiest time to raise a price, in the arithmetic and, as chapter 5 shows, in customers’ eyes.
A store-wide number hides the risky SKUs. Run the tool for each product line above a tenth of revenue. Low-margin SKUs have the most room. A high-margin hero has the least, and its price is the one customers know best (chapter 6).
A stranger sees one price. A customer sees a change. The best evidence on how customers punish a price they think wronged them comes from a catalog company and 55,047 customers.
Managers have long said they avoid changing prices for fear of “antagonizing customers.” Eric Anderson and Duncan Simester found no evidence that anyone had measured it, so they ran a randomized experiment and followed the customers for 28 months.
A mid-sized publishing retailer, selling about 450 of its own products by catalog, sent 55,047 customers one of two versions of a catalog, at random. Thirty-six items were discounted in both. In one version the discounts averaged 34%; in the other, 62%. The group to watch had bought one of the 36 items in the three months before, at a price above the smaller discount.
Those customers, when they received the version with the deeper discount, placed 14.8% fewer orders over the next 28 months, about $90 less revenue each. The share who placed no order at all was 34.0%, against 27.1% with the smaller discounts. The authors called it a boycott Published.
PublishedAnderson and Simester, “Price Stickiness and Customer Antagonism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2010. A second study at an apparel retailer with about 110,000 customers found a smaller effect: 2.4% fewer orders.
The effect was largest among the firm’s most valuable customers, “those whose prior purchases were most recent and at the highest prices” Published. After the study, both retailers stopped sending discount catalogs to customers who had recently bought the discounted items.
The experiment is about a price going down, so read it for the mechanism. A customer who has bought from you carries a reference price, what they paid last time, and judges every later price against it. A new visitor has no reference. A price change is only a change to people who’ve bought before, and the most recent, highest-paying ones feel it most.
That shows up in three places when you raise prices:
A stranger sees a price. A customer sees a change. Plan the rise for the customer.
The usual intuition is that loyal customers are the least price-sensitive. For small changes, habit may keep them buying. But the catalog’s best customers weren’t reacting to a price level. They were reacting to being treated worse than someone else, and many stopped buying across categories. My reading: loyal customers forgive a higher price more readily than an unfair one. The next chapter is about what “unfair” means.
Forty years ago, three economists asked people which price changes felt fair. The answers are still the best rulebook for a price rise.
In 1986 Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch and Richard Thaler published the results of telephone surveys, run in Toronto and Vancouver in 1984 and 1985, that asked people to judge short scenarios about prices, rents and wages. The answers weren’t about whether a price was high. They were about whether a change broke an unwritten deal.
| Scenario | Called it unfair |
|---|---|
| A grocer pays 30 cents more a head for lettuce and raises the price 30 cents | 21% |
| A car dealer ends a $200 discount and sells at list price | 42% |
| A car in short supply: the dealer charges $200 over list | 71% |
| A chain charges 5% more in the one town where it has no competitor | 76% |
| A hardware store raises snow shovels from $15 to $20 the morning after a storm | 82% |
| A landlord learns the tenant took a job nearby and raises the rent $40 more than planned | 91% |
PublishedKahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, “Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market,” American Economic Review, September 1986. Samples of 101 to 157 respondents per question.
The authors explained the pattern with what they called dual entitlement: customers are entitled to the terms of the usual transaction, and firms to their usual profit Published. A rise that protects your profit from a cost you didn’t choose is fair. A rise that exploits demand, a shortage, a lack of competition or a customer who can’t easily leave is not.
Customers let you keep your margin. They don’t let you use their loyalty against them.
When a furniture maker’s cost fell by $20 and it kept its price, 53% of the 1986 respondents called that acceptable Published. People mind a kept saving less than an invented cost. That matters now the 2025 emergency tariffs have been struck down and refunds are moving (chapter 12). But if your announcement said “because of tariffs,” customers will remember. The fair move is a visible gesture back on the SKUs most affected.
Customers know a handful of your prices and almost none of the rest. Raise in reverse order of how well the price is known.
Most brands raise every price by the same percentage because it’s simple. It’s also the riskiest way: the rise lands hardest on the one price everyone remembers, and that price becomes the story.
Peter Dickson and Alan Sawyer observed and interviewed supermarket shoppers. More than half couldn’t correctly name the price of the item they had just put in the cart, and more than half of those who bought something on special didn’t know it was reduced Published. That was 1990 and groceries; a DTC customer who reorders every six weeks knows that price better. But price knowledge is concentrated on a few items bought often, advertised or bought first.
For a DTC brand, the known prices are usually these:
Everything else, from accessories and refills to larger sizes, sets, add-ons and new launches, is known loosely or not at all.
The price everyone knows is the price the rise will be judged by. Move it last and least.
| Move | What | Why |
|---|---|---|
| First | New products, new sizes and new sets | No reference price exists. Launch them at the price you want. |
| First | Accessories, refills, add-ons and the long tail | Low price knowledge, often the highest break-even (chapter 3) |
| Second | Bundles and larger packs | Keep the per-unit price better than singles, so the value story survives |
| Second | The SKUs whose costs rose most | The fairest rise, with a reason you can name (chapter 5) |
| With notice | Subscription and replenishment prices | Known on every charge; protected by notice rules (chapter 8) |
| Last, or through a tier | The hero and the entry product | The prices customers remember, and the ones acquisition depends on |
The entry product’s price shapes who buys a first time. If you raise it, check first orders with The First Offer’s value math, or a proper test if you have the traffic (The Honest Test).
On July 29, 2025, Procter & Gamble said it would raise prices on about a quarter of its US products, by mid-single digits, starting in August. It put the cost of tariffs at about $1 billion before tax in its new fiscal year. Its finance chief described a consumer who was “more selective” and looking for value in larger packs at club, online and big-box retailers Reported.
ReportedReuters, via BNN Bloomberg, July 29, 2025.
Two things are worth copying. The rise was selective, a quarter of the range. And it was single digits, tied to a cost everyone had read about for months. A company with P&G’s pricing power still moved only a quarter of its prices.
The safest way to raise your average price is to leave the known price alone and give people a reason to pay more.
A tier ladder, good, better and best, lets customers choose to pay more. Nobody’s reference price changes, and nobody is told the price went up. When it works, the average price rises while the price people compare stays where it was.
Itamar Simonson found in 1989 that people unsure what they want pick the option with the best reasons behind it, and that an option gains share when it becomes the compromise between two others Published. Add a Best tier above your hero and the hero becomes the sensible middle.
Don’t lean on the decoy effect, where a clearly worse option makes its neighbor look better. Shane Frederick, Leonard Lee and Ernest Baskin found in 2014 that it largely disappeared once people saw, tasted or pictured the products instead of reading numbers Published. Build each tier to be worth buying.
A fence lets different buyers pay different prices without anyone feeling cheated: a larger size, a set, a refill plan, premium materials, a service. It works when it’s real and buyers sort themselves by choosing it. The fence to avoid is “new customers only,” because it makes your existing customers the ones who pay more (chapter 9).
Say a brand sells its hero at $40 with $24 of variable cost. It introduces a smaller $36 version, keeps a $42 standard version with a small upgrade, and adds a $58 premium set ($22 and $30 of variable cost for the small and premium). If 30% buy the smallest, half the standard and a fifth the premium, the average price rises to $43.40 and average contribution per order from $16 to $18.80. That’s 8.5% more on price and 17.5% more on contribution, and the standard version rose only $2.
With the defaults, the ladder lifts average price 8.5% and contribution per order 17.5%, and the gain holds unless more than 71% of buyers choose the $36 version. The risk is the bottom rung. If Good is just a cheaper Better, buyers slide down. Make it a real step down: smaller, plainer.
John Gourville’s 1998 research on “pennies-a-day” framing found that stating a cost as a small daily amount, rather than a yearly total, led people to compare it with small everyday spending and made them more willing to pay Published. In a 2003 follow-up he found the effect reverses at large amounts: people preferred “$1 per day” to “$365 per year,” but “$4200 per year” to “$11.50 per day” Published.
So per-day framing suits consumables that cost a dollar or two a day. A supplement at $48 a month is “$1.60 a day.” A $3,000 mattress is not “$2.74 a day for three years.” For durables, cost per wear or per use works where it’s honest.
My rule around a price rise: show the full price next to the daily one. “Now $52 a month, about $1.73 a day” is fine. “Just 13 cents more a day,” alone, is hiding the change.
Subscribers and loyal buyers should hear first, in dollars, with a date. Whether to keep them on the old price for a while is arithmetic, and the tool below does it.
You can move existing customers to a new price three ways: raise everyone on the same day, tell them first with a window at the old price, or keep them on the old price for a set time. The first is cheapest on paper and most likely to cost you the customers the rise depends on.
The California window runs both ways: a notice 60 days ahead doesn’t count, so send a second inside the 7 to 30 days. The Standing Order covers the mechanics, from pre-renewal reminders to how billing platforms apply a new price.
No loyal customer should learn the new price from a receipt.
A week or two at the old price turns the announcement into a favor. It also pulls orders forward, so expect a spike before the date and a dip after, and read the result over the whole cycle (chapter 14). Cap quantities if a year’s supply at the old price would hurt.
Keeping existing customers on the old price costs you the rise on every order they place in the meantime. It pays only if it keeps enough of them who would otherwise have left. The tool compares raising them now with raising them after a grandfather period, over the same horizon.
With the defaults, three months at the old price costs $24,000 of the rise, keeps 150 customers who would have left, and comes out $14,880 ahead over two years. It pays as long as the delayed rise loses fewer than 4.5% of them, against 6% if you raised now. Stretch the period to twelve months and it loses: the rise you give up grows faster than the customers you keep.
The tool can’t tell you the two loss rates. Guess before the first rise, then measure them with the comparison in chapter 14 and rerun it before the next.
Every place a stranger gets a better deal than a customer. Find them before you raise a price, because a rise makes every one of them visible.
Most DTC brands charge their best customers the most without meaning to. The welcome discount, the creator code and the cart email go to people who haven’t bought yet; the customer on their fifth order pays full price. At a new, higher price, next to a stranger’s 20% off, they notice.
In Britain, the Competition and Markets Authority took up a 2018 “loyalty penalty” super-complaint from Citizens Advice covering five markets Published. The Financial Conduct Authority then banned “price walking” in home and motor insurance: from January 1, 2022, a renewal quote can’t be higher than the price a new customer would get. It estimated the change would save consumers £4.2 billion over ten years Filed. No US rule covers a DTC welcome offer, but the regulators’ view is the customer’s: paying more for staying feels like a penalty.
If a stranger can get a better price than your best customer, your best customer will eventually find out.
Go through each place below and write down the best price a stranger can get and the best price a customer with three orders can get, for your top five SKUs.
| Where | What the customer sees | The fix |
|---|---|---|
| Welcome pop-up | A first-order discount offered on every visit, including theirs | Suppress it for known customers, or offer them something equal |
| Ad, affiliate and creator codes | Codes deeper than anything sent to customers, often on coupon sites within days | Cap public codes at your customer offer; expire and rotate them |
| “New customers only” bundles and trials | A set or starter price they’re barred from | Make the bundle open to all, or give customers a reorder bundle at least as good |
| Marketplaces | The same product cheaper on a marketplace than on your site | Match your own site, or sell a different pack there |
| Subscription first order | A first-box discount far deeper than the ongoing subscriber price | Narrow the gap (The Standing Order) |
| Cart and browse abandonment | A discount for leaving without buying | Remind without a discount; never send one to repeat customers |
| Winback | Lapsed customers offered more than active ones get | Win back with a reason, not a deeper code (The First Offer) |
| Referral | The friend gets more than the customer who referred them | Balance the two sides (Close the Loop) |
| Sales after a full-price order | The price they just paid, cut a week later | Price protection (chapter 10) |
Whether to have a welcome offer at all, and how deep it should be, belongs to The First Offer. The question here is narrower: who can see it, and what the people who’ve already bought get instead.
The fix is rarely the same code. It’s making sure customers never pay more than a stranger, and that what they get instead is worth as much: first access, a better reorder bundle, free shipping, a gift with the third order. My rule: a customer’s best available price on any SKU should never be worse than a new visitor’s, on any day.
If the price drops soon after someone paid the higher one, give them the difference. It’s cheap, and it protects the customers a price change hurts most.
Price protection means refunding the difference when your price falls within a set window after a purchase. It answers Anderson and Simester’s experiment directly: the customers who stopped buying had just paid more than the new price.
A rise is often followed within weeks by the first sale at the new price. Customers who bought at full price just before it are your most recent, highest-paying customers, the group that punished the retailer hardest in the experiment Published. Protection turns that moment from a grievance into a reason to trust you.
Some large retailers already do this. Best Buy’s policy says that if it lowers its own price during the return and exchange period, “we will match our lower price, upon request” Reported.
Say a brand runs a 20% sale two weeks after a rise, and took 2,000 full-price orders averaging $50 in the 14 days before. If every one of those customers asked, protection would cost $20,000. Fewer will ask, and store credit gets spent with you. The other path is those buyers seeing the sale and ordering less for years, as the catalog customers did.
The customer who paid full price last week is the one your sale email should worry about.
Shrinking the pack at the same price works because people don’t notice. The research says those who do notice judge it more harshly than a price rise, and regulators in three countries now require a label.
Shrinkflation is the same price for less product. Coffee that went from a pound to eleven ounces and ice cream from a half gallon to 1.75 quarts are the examples in John Gourville’s work at Harvard Reported. It’s tempting for the same reason it’s controversial: it moves the number customers don’t watch.
Gourville and Jonathan Koehler’s 2004 working paper argued that consumers are more sensitive to price than to quantity Published. Field data agrees. Metin Çakır and Joseph Balagtas studied household purchases of ice cream in Chicago and found that demand responded to package size about a quarter as much as it responded to price Published. Aljoscha Janssen and Johannes Kasinger, in a 2026 study of a decade of US grocery scanner data, found downsizing more than five times as common as upsizing by sales volume, and shoppers more responsive to price than to size Published.
It works when people don’t notice. When they do, they judge it more harshly than a price rise. In five preregistered experiments published in 2024, Ioannis Evangelidis found most people called a cost-driven price rise fair, but the same rise as a smaller pack less so: in the first study, 44.4% called the downsizing unfair against 30.7% for the price rise. The reason was deception. When the change was stated on the pack, the gap disappeared: 36.9% against 35.4% Published.
That is the whole ethics question in two numbers. Shrinking a pack isn’t unfair in itself. Hiding it is, and customers treat it that way.
A smaller pack is a price rise. Say so, and it’s judged like one. Hide it, and it’s judged worse.
A DTC customer uses the product at a steady rate, so a smaller bottle runs out sooner, and on a subscription it runs out before the next box. They’re also the loyal, recent buyers who react most to feeling tricked (chapter 4). The customer most likely to notice your shrinkflation is the one you most want to keep.
None of these reaches a US DTC brand selling from its own site today, but the direction is clear, and the FTC Act’s ban on deceptive practices already applies. Have counsel review any pack change you don’t plan to announce.
The hidden rise is the old size divided by the new, minus one. A 16-ounce jar cut to 14 is a 14.3% rise per ounce; twelve bars cut to ten, 20% per bar Derived. Bigger rises than most brands would announce, which is why they’re done quietly.
The 2025 and 2026 tariff changes gave every importer a cost customers had read about. They don’t tell you how much to raise, on what, or how often.
For importers, the last eighteen months were a lesson in pricing against a moving cost. The lesson: pass through a share, not the rate; price for the cost you can see a year out; and don’t reprice every time Washington does.
| Date | What happened |
|---|---|
| August 29, 2025 | Duty-free entry for parcels of $800 or less suspended for all countries; a June 2026 CBP rule continued it indefinitely for non-postal shipments. |
| February 20, 2026 | The Supreme Court ruled 6–3 in Learning Resources v. Trump that the emergency powers law behind the 2025 tariffs doesn’t authorize tariffs. |
| February 24 to July 23, 2026 | A temporary 10% tariff on imports under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, limited by law to 150 days. |
| Spring 2026 | Customs set up a refund claim system for the struck-down duties: about $165 billion, over 330,000 importers. |
| July 24, 2026 | Section 301 tariffs of 10% to 12.5% on 60 economies replaced it, with exemptions including Section 232 goods and qualifying free trade goods. Chinese goods already under the 25% Section 301 tariff: 37.5%. |
FiledSupreme Court opinion, Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, No. 24-1287, February 20, 2026; CBP interim final rule, Federal Register, June 24, 2026. ReportedSkadden on the refund process, March 24, 2026; Honigman on the Section 301 tariffs, July 24, 2026. Rates change often; check the current schedule before you price.
Alberto Cavallo and colleagues at Harvard’s Pricing Lab, tracking about 360,000 products at five large US retailers, estimated consumers bore 43% of the tariff cost in the first seven months Reported. Mary Amiti, Sebastian Heise and David Weinstein, in a July 2026 NBER working paper, estimated about 26% of the tariff increase reached consumer prices, and found the indirect part, through domestic makers’ costs and markups, took nine to twelve months to arrive Reported. Economists at the Minneapolis Fed found the pass-through arriving late: clothing and footwear inflation rose from 0.3% a year in December 2025 to 3.5% in July 2026 Reported.
Methods differ, so take the lesson, not a number: sellers passed on less than the full tariff and spread it over time. That’s also what customers call fair (chapter 5).
A tariff applies to the customs value, not your retail price. Say a product sells for $40 with a customs value of $10. A 12.5% duty adds $1.25, 3.1% of the price. Raising the price 12.5% would be a rise four times the cost. Put the duty per unit into landed cost and the break-even tool in chapter 3.
Pass through a share of the cost, once, on the SKUs it hit. Not the tariff rate, every time it moves.
A price rise announcement has one reader who matters: the customer who knows the old price. Tell them first, in dollars, with the reason and what you’re doing for them.
Netflix’s 2011 announcement is the classic bad one, and it was bad less for the price than for who heard it and how.
In July 2011 Netflix split its DVD-by-mail and streaming plans. For customers who wanted both, the cheapest bill “jumped from $10 to $16 a month.” In September it announced it would move DVDs to a separate service called Qwikster, then dropped the idea in October. In the third quarter Netflix lost 800,000 US subscribers, falling from 24.6 million to 23.8 million, and its shares fell 27% in after-hours trading on the day it reported Reported.
Its letter to shareholders named the problem precisely: many long-term members “felt shocked by the pricing changes,” and more of them canceled than Netflix expected. It added: “We’ve hurt our hard-earned reputation, and stalled our domestic growth,” and “we are done with pricing changes.” Dropping Qwikster, Reed Hastings had already admitted to “moving too fast” Reported.
ReportedCNN Money, October 24, 2011, quoting Netflix’s third-quarter letter to shareholders and Hastings’ October 10 statement.
Read it against the earlier chapters. The rise was 60% for customers who wanted both services, far beyond any cost they could see (chapter 5). The people who left were long-term members, the ones with a reference price (chapter 4). And a second change came on top of the first. Netflix went on to grow for another decade, but that quarter shows what a careless announcement costs.
Customers forgive a price. They don’t forgive a surprise.
Email subscribers inside your notice window, with SMS for those who’ve agreed to it. Email recent and repeat buyers a week or two before the date. No site banner: new visitors see one price. Put the reason and protection policy on an FAQ page. Templates are in Appendix B.
Support needs the new prices, the reason, the dates, the stock-up and protection rules, and authority to give a one-time courtesy, such as the old price on one order. Read every price-related ticket for two weeks: they’re the earliest signal of whether the story is landing.
Judge the rise on whether the customers who saw it kept buying, at 90 and 180 days, against a comparison. Conversion rate is a guardrail, not a verdict.
The week after a rise, someone will read the conversion rate and declare victory or defeat. Both are premature. New visitors have no reference price. The stock-up window moves orders around the date. And customers who leave over price just don’t come back: in Anderson and Simester’s experiment the lost orders showed up over 28 months Published.
You need something to compare with, decided before the rise. Three workable options, best first:
Randomly holding some customers at old prices gives the cleanest answer, and creates what chapter 9 warns about: two customers paying different prices. If you do it, keep the group small, give it an end date, and have counsel review it. The Honest Test covers price tests.
| Number | Defined as | When | What it catches |
|---|---|---|---|
| Volume against break-even | Units per SKU, four-week average after the stock-up window, against break-even (chapter 3) | Weekly | A rise losing more than it can afford |
| Contribution per SKU | Monthly contribution against the same months before | Monthly | Whether the rise earns what it should |
| 90-day repeat rate | Share of customers active before the rise who reordered within 90 days, against the comparison | Day 90 | The early read on existing customers |
| 180-day repeat rate | The same, at 180 days | Day 180 | The verdict |
| Subscriber survival | Share active through the first two renewals at the new price | Each renewal | Subscribers leaving quietly |
| Price cancellations and tickets | Cancellations and tickets citing price, per 1,000 orders | Weekly | A story that isn’t landing |
| Tier mix | Share of orders in each tier | Weekly | Buyers sliding down the ladder (chapter 7) |
| New-customer conversion and first-order value | Against the four weeks before | Weekly | A guardrail on acquisition, not the verdict |
Conversion tells you how strangers took the price. Retention tells you how your customers took the rise.
At 90 days, compare each SKU’s volume loss with its break-even and the repeat rate with the comparison. Volume loss well inside break-even and a repeat rate close to the comparison is a rise that worked; confirm it at 180 days. If repeat rate falls further behind than the break-even allows, the fix is usually in chapter 9 or chapter 10, not a price cut. Rerun the tool in chapter 8 with the loss you saw before the next rise.
The math, then the plan, then the customers, then the switch. Four weeks, in that order.
A price rise done well takes about a month, most of it spent on the people who already buy from you.
At day thirty you’ll know early volume against break-even and what customers are saying. The answer comes at day 90 and day 180.
Customers first, then the site. Math before both.
Six things whoever owns the price rise needs on the first day.
Whoever runs the rise, a finance lead, a retention lead, or you on the Monday you decide, needs six things on day one. Without them, the first two weeks go on finding numbers that should have been handed over.
The books and papers this guide leans on, and what to take from each.
And the papers to read first: Anderson and Simester (2010) on customer antagonism, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) on fairness, and Evangelidis (2024) on shrinkflation. Full references are in Appendix C.
Andrew Lauchner runs Growth Legend, embedding inside consumer brands to own lifecycle, email and SMS, and revenue operations. He is the author of The Second Order, on turning first-time buyers into second-time buyers, and The Whole Machine, on the fundamentals of DTC growth, along with a series of field guides for DTC operators at andrewlauchner.com.
As Senior Director of Growth and Retention Marketing at Gallery Furniture, he rebuilt the customer journey and the sales playbooks together. He has worked on growth and retention at Binance and 3Commas, and has been Head of Growth and Retention at Greatness Wins and at Nexus Agriscience.
“Andrew led retention, lifecycle, and email/SMS, but what separates him from most in this space is how deeply he understands the role retention plays in the overall growth engine.”
Akram Khan, Head of Marketing at Gallery Furniture, senior to Andrew but didn’t manage Andrew directly
Andrew answers every note from operators working on this, including those looking for someone to own it. Write to andrew@growthlegend.com or message him on LinkedIn.
The formulas behind the three tools, and four queries to run before and after a price rise.
| For | Formula | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Break-even volume loss | r / (m + r) | r: price rise as a share of today’s price. m: contribution margin today. Both as decimals or both as percents. |
| Break-even elasticity | −(r / (m + r)) / r = −1 / (m + r) | If your customers’ response is weaker than this, the rise pays. |
| Contribution change | U(1 − x)(P(1 + r) − C) − U(P − C) | U: units. x: volume lost. P: price. C: variable cost per unit. |
| Grandfather against raise now | N·o·G·c0 + N(1 − b)·o·(H − G)·c1 − N(1 − a)·o·H·c1 | N: customers. o: orders per month each. G: grandfather months. H: horizon. c0, c1: contribution per order at old and new price. a, b: extra loss if raised now and after G. |
| Tier mix | Σ sharei × (pricei − costi) | Average contribution per order. The Good share that erases the gain: (cup − ctoday) / (cup − cgood), where cup is the share-weighted contribution of Better and Best. |
-- last 90 days; sku_costs is a landed-cost table kept by finance
WITH lines AS (
SELECT l.sku,
SUM(l.quantity) AS units,
SUM(l.quantity * l.price - l.discount) AS net_revenue,
SUM(l.quantity * (c.landed_cost + c.fulfillment_cost + c.packaging_cost)) AS unit_costs,
SUM((o.shipping_cost - o.shipping_charged + o.payment_fee)
* (l.quantity * l.price - l.discount)
/ NULLIF(o.subtotal, 0)) AS allocated_order_costs
FROM order_lines l
JOIN orders o ON o.id = l.order_id
JOIN sku_costs c ON c.sku = l.sku
WHERE o.created_at >= CURRENT_DATE - INTERVAL '90 days'
GROUP BY l.sku
)
SELECT sku, units,
net_revenue / units AS avg_price,
(net_revenue - unit_costs - allocated_order_costs) / units AS contribution_per_unit,
(net_revenue - unit_costs - allocated_order_costs) / net_revenue AS contribution_margin
FROM lines
ORDER BY net_revenue DESC;
Order-level costs are shared across lines by revenue, an approximation; use it consistently. The margin column is m in the break-even formula.
-- weekly units per SKU, 12 weeks before and after the rise
-- :rise_date and the SKU list come from the plan
SELECT l.sku,
DATE_TRUNC('week', o.created_at) AS week,
SUM(l.quantity) AS units,
(o.created_at >= :rise_date) AS after_rise
FROM order_lines l
JOIN orders o ON o.id = l.order_id
WHERE o.created_at BETWEEN :rise_date - INTERVAL '12 weeks'
AND :rise_date + INTERVAL '12 weeks'
AND l.sku IN (:raised_skus)
GROUP BY 1, 2, 4
ORDER BY 1, 2;
Leave out the stock-up weeks, compare four-week averages against each SKU’s break-even, and do the same for SKUs you didn’t raise.
-- customers active in the 90 days before the rise, and the same window a year earlier
WITH base AS (
SELECT customer_id, 'this_year' AS cohort, :rise_date AS start_date
FROM orders
WHERE created_at >= :rise_date - INTERVAL '90 days' AND created_at < :rise_date
GROUP BY customer_id
UNION ALL
SELECT customer_id, 'last_year', :rise_date - INTERVAL '1 year'
FROM orders
WHERE created_at >= :rise_date - INTERVAL '1 year' - INTERVAL '90 days'
AND created_at < :rise_date - INTERVAL '1 year'
GROUP BY customer_id
)
SELECT b.cohort,
COUNT(*) AS customers,
AVG(CASE WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM orders o WHERE o.customer_id = b.customer_id
AND o.created_at >= b.start_date
AND o.created_at < b.start_date + INTERVAL '90 days') THEN 1 ELSE 0 END) AS repeat_90,
AVG(CASE WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM orders o WHERE o.customer_id = b.customer_id
AND o.created_at >= b.start_date
AND o.created_at < b.start_date + INTERVAL '180 days') THEN 1 ELSE 0 END) AS repeat_180
FROM base b
GROUP BY b.cohort;
Read the first column at day 90 and the second at day 180. If the stock-up window pulled orders forward, count from the day after it closes, for both cohorts.
-- average discount as a share of list, first orders against repeat orders, last 90 days
SELECT CASE WHEN o.customer_order_number = 1 THEN 'first order' ELSE 'repeat order' END AS type,
COUNT(DISTINCT o.id) AS orders,
SUM(l.discount) / NULLIF(SUM(l.quantity * l.price), 0) AS discount_share,
AVG(CASE WHEN o.discount_code IS NOT NULL THEN 1 ELSE 0 END) AS share_with_code
FROM orders o
JOIN order_lines l ON l.order_id = o.id
WHERE o.created_at >= CURRENT_DATE - INTERVAL '90 days'
GROUP BY 1;
Deeper first-order discounts are expected. Look for repeat customers using public codes meant for strangers, and, grouping by l.sku too, repeat orders at a worse effective price than first orders.
Notices, emails, texts and policies. Replace everything in braces, and have counsel review the subscriber notice for your states.
SKUS AND RISES sku: old price -> new price (break-even loss %)
REASON one sentence, naming the cost:
WHAT WE ABSORBED $ or % of the cost we're not passing on:
TIERS any new Good / Best versions instead of a rise:
SUBSCRIBERS notice date(s) inside each state's window;
grandfather: yes/no, end date:
REPEAT BUYERS email date; stock-up window from ... to ...;
quantity cap:
LOYALTY TAX FIXES rows from the table fixed before the date:
PRICE PROTECTION window, refund or credit, where it's shown:
COMPARISON staggered SKUs / last year's cohort / affected
vs unaffected; baseline saved on:
READS day 90: ... day 180: ... owner:
COUNSEL REVIEWED notice, pack changes, fee lines: date / name
SUBJECT A Price Change for Your {Product} Subscription
PREVIEW what's changing on {date}, and what stays the same
Hi {first_name},
On {date}, the price of your {product} subscription will go from
${old} to ${new} per {delivery}. Your next charge at the new price
will be on {first_new_charge_date}.
Why: {one sentence naming the cost, e.g. "the duty on the bottles
we import rose to 12.5% in July."} We're absorbing {part} of that
ourselves.
{If grandfathering:} Because you've been with us {since/for ...},
your price stays at ${old} until {end_date}.
Nothing else changes: same product, same schedule. You can skip,
change your delivery date or product, or cancel anytime here:
{manage_link}. If you have questions, reply to this email and
{name} will answer.
{Name}, {title}
{Brand} · {postal address}
This is a service message about your subscription.
Manage your subscription: {manage_link}
Email preferences or unsubscribe from marketing: {unsubscribe_link}
SUBJECT Our Prices Change on {Date}. Here's Your Heads-Up
PREVIEW you can still order at today's price until {date}
Hi {first_name},
You've ordered {product} from us before, so you're hearing this
before anyone else: on {date}, {product} goes from ${old} to ${new}.
Why: {one sentence naming the cost}.
Until {date}, you can order at today's price. {Limit: up to
{n} per order.} [Order at ${old}]
And if we ever lower the price of something within {window} days
of your order, we'll refund the difference. Just reply to your
order email.
{Name}
{Brand} · {postal address}
You're receiving this because you bought from {Brand}.
Unsubscribe: {unsubscribe_link}
{Brand}: Hi {first_name}, on {date} your {product} subscription
goes from ${old} to ${new} because {short reason}. Skip, change
or cancel anytime: {link}. Reply STOP to opt out
PRICE PROTECTION
If we lower the price of an item within {14/30} days of your
order, we'll refund the difference to your original payment
method {or: as store credit, if you prefer}. Reply to your order
confirmation or email {support_email} with your order number.
This applies to our own prices on {brand}.com, including sales.
It doesn't apply to {clearance items marked final sale}.
Thanks for asking, {first_name}. {Product} went from ${old} to
${new} on {date} because {reason}. We absorbed {part} of it and
passed on the rest.
{If they missed the window:} Since you're a regular, I've
{applied your last price to this order / added a ${x} credit}.
That's a one-time courtesy.
{If a subscriber:} You can skip, change or cancel anytime here:
{manage_link}.
PRODUCT PAGE, NEXT TO THE PRICE
Now {new size} (was {old size}). Price per {unit}: ${new_unit}
(was ${old_unit}). Why we changed it: {one sentence}.
EMAIL LINE TO RECENT BUYERS
A heads-up: your next {product} will be {new size}, down from
{old size}, at the same ${price}. {If subscriber: We've moved
your delivery to every {n} days so you won't run short.}
Every external source, by chapter. Web sources were read in September 2026.