A cooler company that became mostly a drinkware company, and a shoe company that stopped making its first apparel line. What their filings say, and what they don’t.
Both of these companies sell mostly direct to consumers, both are public, and both expanded beyond their first product. One expansion became the larger part of the business. The other’s first line was discontinued. Everything here comes from their SEC filings.
YETI was founded in 2006 by Roy and Ryan Seiders, who wanted a “nearly indestructible hard cooler with superior ice retention” for hunting and fishing Filed. In 2014 it launched the Hopper soft cooler and, in its words, “entered a new category with the Rambler drinkware line” Filed. Net sales went from $89.9 million in 2013 to $468.9 million in 2015 Filed. By 2019 drinkware was 58% of net sales, and in 2024 it was 60%, with coolers and equipment at 38% Filed. The direct channel was 59% of net sales in 2024 Filed.
FiledYETI Holdings, Form S-1, July 2016; Form 10-K for 2019, February 2020; Form 10-K for 2024, February 2025.
On the four shared things, drinkware scores high on customer (the same outdoor buyer), occasion (the same trips and job sites) and above all proof: a brand trusted for ice retention is believed when it says it keeps a drink cold. It’s weaker on supply chain, a different product to make at a much lower price. That’s one step out. The company describes its method the same way: “anchor products, followed by product expansions,” such as sizes and colorways, then accessories Filed. Core first, then the next ring, then the ring after.
Two cautions. Scoring a success after the fact is the hindsight chapter 3 warned about. And the filings don’t split drinkware’s growth between cooler owners and new customers; the 2016 filing credits the 2014 launches with expanding YETI’s “reach beyond the premium hard cooler category” Filed. A cheaper product that carries the brand’s proof is also an entry point.
Allbirds built its brand on wool sneakers. Its 2023 annual report says footwear “represents the vast majority of our revenue and is the foundation of our brand” Filed. The same report explains what happened to its first apparel line: “our customers have not purchased certain of these products in sufficient quantities,” demand “failed to meet our expectations,” and in the second quarter of 2022 the company “determined that we needed to adjust our overall apparel strategy and discontinue the product line” Filed. It still sells tees, sweats, socks and underwear, described as secondary offerings.
Net revenue fell 14.7%, from $297.8 million in 2022 to $254.1 million in 2023, and the net loss widened from $101.4 million to $152.5 million Filed. The 2024 annual report sets the goal of growing “within our existing customer base” and increasing “closet share by focusing on our core franchise products” Filed. Closet share is share of wallet, in apparel. After the expansion, the plan was headroom in the core.
FiledAllbirds, Form 10-K for 2023, March 2024; Form 8-K with fourth-quarter 2023 results, March 12, 2024; Form 10-K for 2024, March 2025.
Be careful with the lesson. Apparel wasn’t Allbirds’ only problem: the March 2023 transformation plan also slowed store openings and reconsidered its international approach Filed. And the filing says customers didn’t buy enough, not why. The honest reading is narrower: a brand whose proof was comfort and materials in shoes found that the proof didn’t carry customers into first-generation apparel in the numbers it planned for, and the plan it wrote afterward pointed back at the core.
One expansion borrowed the core’s proof. The other borrowed its name.
Both companies ended up talking about the core: YETI’s method starts with anchor products, and Allbirds’ recovery plan starts with core franchises and closet share. Filings show outcomes, not mechanisms, so use cases like these to ask better questions about your own candidates, not to predict them.
This is one chapter of The Next Category, which is free and readable in full on a single page with no form in front of it.